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 ﾠ Reform	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠback	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠagenda,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠ1974,	 ﾠ38	 ﾠyears	 ﾠago.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠstart	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSeoul	 ﾠsummit	 ﾠin	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠG20	 ﾠ
leaders	 ﾠrequested	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠFund	 ﾠ(IMF)	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠ“indicative	 ﾠguidelines”	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
imbalances	 ﾠin	 ﾠpayments.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠare	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠa	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimperfections	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠprecipitating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2007-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaware	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinitive	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalleged	 ﾠlinkage,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠGovernor	 ﾠMervyn	 ﾠKing	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBank	 ﾠof	 ﾠEngland	 ﾠ
stated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠthat	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠimbalances	 ﾠwere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠcause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠwould	 ﾠremain	 ﾠvulnerable	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠcorrected.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠ“global	 ﾠ
imbalances,”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠusage	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmean	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠimbalances	 ﾠ(goods,	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
investment	 ﾠincome)	 ﾠin	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠpayments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠview	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠimplicated,	 ﾠin	 ﾠtransferring	 ﾠ
savings	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠChina,	 ﾠGermany,	 ﾠJapan,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoil-ﾭ‐exporting	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ–	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
smaller	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNetherlands,	 ﾠSingapore,	 ﾠSwitzerland,	 ﾠand	 ﾠSweden	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
investment	 ﾠbooms	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠand	 ﾠabove	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠto	 ﾠmention	 ﾠ
Greece	 ﾠand	 ﾠIreland),	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠworld	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmain	 ﾠcause,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠin	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠin	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠ
Britain	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMany	 ﾠparties,	 ﾠeach	 ﾠpursuing	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠnarrow	 ﾠinterests,	 ﾠwere	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠbanks,	 ﾠrating	 ﾠagencies,	 ﾠaccounting	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠexcessively	 ﾠtolerant	 ﾠ
financial	 ﾠregulators.	 ﾠ(The	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠadvisers	 ﾠof	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠhave	 ﾠundeservingly	 ﾠescaped	 ﾠcensure.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠone	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
watching	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠparlance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠnarrower	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠ
economy	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcomponents	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠeconomy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠdesignates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠ
conventions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠFund	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBank	 ﾠfor	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠ
Settlements.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠregime,	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠcall	 ﾠit,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrespects	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsystematic	 ﾠ–	 ﾠactually	 ﾠworked	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠfew	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreventing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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but	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreventing	 ﾠit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠan	 ﾠeven	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠrecession	 ﾠthan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhad.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
Central	 ﾠBank	 ﾠ(ECB)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠReserve	 ﾠacted	 ﾠpromptly	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠin	 ﾠeuros	 ﾠand	 ﾠdollars.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfall	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdollars	 ﾠrose	 ﾠsharply	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠLehman	 ﾠBrothers,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠReserve	 ﾠopened	 ﾠswap	 ﾠlines	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠother	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbanks	 ﾠexceeding	 ﾠ
$700	 ﾠbillion,	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠpeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠ$554	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠwere	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠIMF	 ﾠeased	 ﾠits	 ﾠlending	 ﾠ
criteria	 ﾠand	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠits	 ﾠlending	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠby	 ﾠSDR	 ﾠ73	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠ(over	 ﾠ$100	 ﾠbillion)	 ﾠduring	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
2009,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠFlexible	 ﾠCredit	 ﾠLine.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstrictly	 ﾠa	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠBretton	 ﾠWoods	 ﾠinstitutions,	 ﾠpledged	 ﾠto	 ﾠdouble	 ﾠits	 ﾠannual	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠlending,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
increased	 ﾠits	 ﾠlending	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ$25	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$47	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$59	 ﾠbillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
2010.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠG20	 ﾠsummit	 ﾠof	 ﾠNovember	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠstimulus	 ﾠactions	 ﾠby	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠand	 ﾠpledged	 ﾠto	 ﾠresist	 ﾠprotectionist	 ﾠactions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwere	 ﾠachieved.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠG20	 ﾠ
agreed	 ﾠin	 ﾠspring	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1979.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠduly	 ﾠ
accomplished	 ﾠby	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ$250	 ﾠbillion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ
continued	 ﾠto	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠsmoothly,	 ﾠunlike	 ﾠinterbank	 ﾠlending	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTrue,	 ﾠ
exchange	 ﾠrates	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠremain	 ﾠstable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠdollar	 ﾠappreciated	 ﾠsharply	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfall	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠ
despite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvast	 ﾠinjection	 ﾠof	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠReserve	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠmany	 ﾠchannels,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠunorthodox,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
total	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠReserve	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ$0.9	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠJuly	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠto	 ﾠ$2.3	 ﾠtrillion	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
year.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole,	 ﾠas	 ﾠCharles	 ﾠWyplosz	 ﾠhas	 ﾠshown,	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠserved	 ﾠto	 ﾠcushion	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
decline	 ﾠin	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠworst	 ﾠhit	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecession.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠevents	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠworse	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠgood	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠregime	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
examining	 ﾠits	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠcritically	 ﾠand	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmaterially	 ﾠimproved	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠ
crises.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠnoted,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠexamination	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ38	 ﾠyears	 ﾠago	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠSolomon,	 ﾠ1982,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Williamson,	 ﾠ1977,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgood	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexamination).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAll	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐
examined	 ﾠcritically	 ﾠevery	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠor	 ﾠtwo,	 ﾠif	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠremind	 ﾠeach	 ﾠnew	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipants,	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠprivate,	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠare	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ All	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠregimes	 ﾠhave	 ﾠclassically	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthree	 ﾠheadings:	 ﾠ
adjustment,	 ﾠliquidity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcredibility.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠto	 ﾠimbalances	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠpayments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregime	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
payment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠhow	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠgrows	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠare	 ﾠcredibly	 ﾠdurable	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
regime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBretton	 ﾠWoods	 ﾠregime,	 ﾠformally	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠby	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐1940s,	 ﾠ
lacked	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠfor	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠworld	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠ
acquisitions	 ﾠof	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠgold	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠnew	 ﾠproduction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1950s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1960s	 ﾠgrew	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠthan	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmid-ﾭ‐1940s	 ﾠ(haunted	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠfear	 ﾠof	 ﾠsecular	 ﾠ
stagnation	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠDepression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
liquidity	 ﾠwas	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠby	 ﾠsales	 ﾠof	 ﾠgold	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ(inordinately	 ﾠhigh)	 ﾠUS	 ﾠgold	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacquisition	 ﾠof	 ﾠUS	 ﾠtreasury	 ﾠbills	 ﾠby	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠbanks.	 ﾠ	 ﾠProfessor	 ﾠRobert	 ﾠTriffin	 ﾠof	 ﾠYale	 ﾠ
University	 ﾠpointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdilemma	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠarrangement:	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠdollar	 ﾠholdings	 ﾠwere	 ﾠrestricted,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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world	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrestrained;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcontinued,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgold	 ﾠconvertibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdollar	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠonly)	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠquestionable	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠUS	 ﾠdollar	 ﾠliabilities	 ﾠ
rose	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠto	 ﾠUS	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠgold	 ﾠstocks.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠTriffin	 ﾠDilemma,	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠknown,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠresolved	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠFund	 ﾠand	 ﾠallocate	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠ–	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠgold,	 ﾠas	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
journalists	 ﾠappropriately	 ﾠdubbed	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmade	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1969,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠexecuted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1970-ﾭ‐72.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠlittle,	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠlate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDollars	 ﾠflowed	 ﾠabundantly	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠ
States	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecession	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1970-ﾭ‐71,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠlow	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠand	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠRichard	 ﾠNixon	 ﾠclosed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
gold	 ﾠwindow	 ﾠin	 ﾠAugust	 ﾠ1971.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠresolved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTriffin	 ﾠdilemma	 ﾠdefinitively,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠleft	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠa	 ﾠdollar	 ﾠstandard.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠafter	 ﾠanother	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠand	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠcurrencies	 ﾠto	 ﾠfloat	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdollar,	 ﾠviolating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBretton	 ﾠWoods	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
calling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠ(but	 ﾠif	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠadjustable)	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐aligned	 ﾠby	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
agreement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSmithsonian	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠin	 ﾠDecember	 ﾠ1971.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠrule	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
subsequently	 ﾠdropped.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdealt	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠmanagement	 ﾠof	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠ
demand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠadjustments	 ﾠin	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“fundamental	 ﾠdisequilibrium.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠwas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsymmetric,	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeficit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠnever	 ﾠworked	 ﾠvery	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠposed	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠ
since	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinauguration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBretton	 ﾠWoods	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
1950s,	 ﾠon	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNetherlands	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1960s,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOPEC	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1970s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
early	 ﾠ1980s,	 ﾠon	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1980s,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠChina	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ6	 ﾠor	 ﾠ7	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCompliance	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“scarce	 ﾠcurrency”	 ﾠclause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠIMF	 ﾠarticles,	 ﾠwhereby	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠif	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠdiscriminate	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠin	 ﾠsurplus	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠits	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
necessary	 ﾠits	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurplus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscarce	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠclause	 ﾠoperated	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
country’s	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠscarce	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIMF,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnever	 ﾠinvoked.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ What	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapplicability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠcriteria	 ﾠtoday?	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmean,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
allowed	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrate	 ﾠarrangements,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ“adjustment”?	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠenough	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrun	 ﾠ
current	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠdeficits	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠunable	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinance	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠon-ﾭ‐going,	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠsustainable,	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdeficit	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠattract	 ﾠ
additional	 ﾠnet	 ﾠinflows	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠabout	 ﾠothers?	 ﾠ	 ﾠConcern	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠabout	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠimbalances,	 ﾠsurpluses	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠdeficits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSeoul	 ﾠsummit	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠ
imbalances,	 ﾠsurpluses	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠdeficits,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠheld	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠ4	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
systemically	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsummit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfind	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
summit,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠspared	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsummiteers	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠaddressing	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠalso	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠin	 ﾠexcess	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsummit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠ
why	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshould	 ﾠor	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcovered.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Surely	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠrule	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠright	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠglobalized	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠor	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠadvanced	 ﾠstage	 ﾠof	 ﾠglobalization,	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠis	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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intertemporal	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠborrowing	 ﾠor	 ﾠlending	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠand	 ﾠrepaying	 ﾠor	 ﾠliquidating	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠlater.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Periods	 ﾠof	 ﾠnet	 ﾠborrowing	 ﾠor	 ﾠlending	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgo	 ﾠon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlong	 ﾠperiods	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCanada	 ﾠran	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
deficits	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ100	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠexceptions	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠworld	 ﾠwars),	 ﾠas	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠ
flowed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwell	 ﾠendowed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠresources	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsound	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠShould	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
denied?	 ﾠ	 ﾠSingapore,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠsensibly	 ﾠinvests	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
savings	 ﾠabroad,	 ﾠthus	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠa	 ﾠpersistent	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠsurplus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠProfound	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠtrends	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠaging	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠsavers	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
bulk	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpopulations	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠemployed,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠup	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠ
down	 ﾠafter	 ﾠretirement.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠretirees	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠpreservation	 ﾠof	 ﾠprincipal,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwant	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠin	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠor	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠaction	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠinvestors,	 ﾠas	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠin	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠdeveloping	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
surpluses	 ﾠmay	 ﾠendure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠturn	 ﾠinto	 ﾠdeficits,	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
decline	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠbalance,	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠalready	 ﾠoccurring	 ﾠin	 ﾠJapan,	 ﾠfollowed	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠin	 ﾠearnings	 ﾠon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
investments	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠslowly	 ﾠliquidated.	 ﾠOil-ﾭ‐exporting	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠselling	 ﾠa	 ﾠdepletable	 ﾠresource	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
world	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsensibly	 ﾠrun	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠsurpluses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠyears	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ
diversify	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠportfolios	 ﾠby	 ﾠconverting	 ﾠoil	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠinto	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠinvestments,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproceeds	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠgenerations	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoil	 ﾠis	 ﾠdepleted.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠarithmetic	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ
balances	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠrun	 ﾠpersistent	 ﾠsurpluses,	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrun	 ﾠpersistent	 ﾠ
deficits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠApart	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmeasurement	 ﾠerrors,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠsum	 ﾠof	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠbalances	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠzero.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐evident	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠroutinely	 ﾠignored	 ﾠin	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcorrective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠor	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry’s	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠof	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠis	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
exchange	 ﾠreserves,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠacquires	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠintervention,	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠor	 ﾠindirectly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠ
market.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠworld	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠmay	 ﾠplausibly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
rise.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch?	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠformula	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠin	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠto	 ﾠimports	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
indeed	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠother	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠtransactions,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠearly	 ﾠwork	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠ
reserves	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlow	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmobility)	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsquare	 ﾠroot	 ﾠof	 ﾠimports,	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠimports,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmore	 ﾠslowly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWith	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmobility,	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠcould	 ﾠgrow	 ﾠless	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
capital	 ﾠflows	 ﾠwere	 ﾠreliably	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠactions	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates)	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠconcerned,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠif	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠwere	 ﾠvolatile	 ﾠand	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeasily	 ﾠpredicted.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠminds	 ﾠon	 ﾠconcrete	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠhere’s	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposal:	 ﾠlet	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠset	 ﾠa	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠfive	 ﾠyears	 ﾠhence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThen	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠthese	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠnational	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠand	 ﾠreview.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEach	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠits	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠ
before	 ﾠpeers,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠunusually	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠor	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdjustments	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
result	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdiscussions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThen	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠfive	 ﾠyears	 ﾠto	 ﾠmatch	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠadjusted	 ﾠtargets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfashion,	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠreserves,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠresort	 ﾠto	 ﾠnational	 ﾠcurrencies,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
matched	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreserves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Current	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠcould	 ﾠin	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠset	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegotiation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠWilliamson	 ﾠ(1998,	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠsum	 ﾠto	 ﾠzero	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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world	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchances	 ﾠof	 ﾠreaching	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
negligibly	 ﾠsmall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(An	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠassign	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠ
oil	 ﾠprice	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1974	 ﾠpredictably	 ﾠfailed,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdramatic	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
discussion	 ﾠusefully	 ﾠsensitized	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparticipating	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinterdependence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
unavoidably	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠOPEC	 ﾠsurpluses.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠwould	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠan	 ﾠextra	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠfreedom,	 ﾠ
whereby	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmatched	 ﾠto	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠdemand.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ SDRs	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtargets;	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotals	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
match.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠare	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠquotas	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIMF.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(All	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
except	 ﾠCuba,	 ﾠNorth	 ﾠKorea,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmicro	 ﾠstates	 ﾠare	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIMF;	 ﾠTaiwan	 ﾠand	 ﾠHong	 ﾠ
Kong	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexcluded.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠallocations	 ﾠwould	 ﾠearn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠby	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠsurpluses	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠliabilities	 ﾠto	 ﾠforeigners.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠallocations	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠwould	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠabroad	 ﾠ(net)	 ﾠor	 ﾠrun	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠdeficits.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
example,	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠtargeted	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠfive	 ﾠyears	 ﾠhence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwas	 ﾠdouble	 ﾠits	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠand	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠto	 ﾠearn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
current	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠsurplus,	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠnet	 ﾠinward	 ﾠinvestment,	 ﾠor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠ
construction,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcumulative	 ﾠSDR	 ﾠ
allocations	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ SDRs	 ﾠas	 ﾠconstituted	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠcan	 ﾠonly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠnational	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠ
international	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠa	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠreserves,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠissued	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠuse	 ﾠfacilitated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠMonetary	 ﾠFund.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠwider,	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcontemplated	 ﾠeventually,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠinterim	 ﾠcurrencies	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdollar,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeuro,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
maybe	 ﾠsomeday	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠyuan	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠtransactions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
bought	 ﾠand	 ﾠsold	 ﾠin	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠco-ﾭ‐exist	 ﾠwith	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠand	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
continue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠtransactions.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtailored	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠ
incremental	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠreserves,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcurrencies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnecessary,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠoutstanding	 ﾠlegacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠholdings	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcurrencies.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Reserves	 ﾠrise	 ﾠand	 ﾠfall	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCountries	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuddenly	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
improvement	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠoil	 ﾠprices	 ﾠfor	 ﾠoil	 ﾠexporters)	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
unexpected	 ﾠinflow	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠa	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwant	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠ
rates	 ﾠto	 ﾠappreciate	 ﾠfully.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprohibited.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠhere	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
medium	 ﾠterm.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠrise	 ﾠpersisted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠinflows	 ﾠcontinued,	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠby	 ﾠraising	 ﾠimports	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠstimulating	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠoutflows	 ﾠor	 ﾠboth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠallowed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠindefinitely	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtargets.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbalance-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐
payments	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠis	 ﾠall	 ﾠabout.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠarises	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠfreely	 ﾠfloating	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠat	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeurozone,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠthree	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
IMF	 ﾠquotas.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠregions	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdeclare	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠno	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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or	 ﾠonly	 ﾠminimal	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠto	 ﾠallow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠunusual	 ﾠcontingencies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠSDR	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
substantially	 ﾠabove	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtargets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠcould	 ﾠdecline	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠallocation,	 ﾠdonate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnew	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsome	 ﾠworthy	 ﾠcause	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank,	 ﾠor	 ﾠagree	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠallotted	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠeligible	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpresentations	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠcurrency	 ﾠ(pounds,	 ﾠeuros,	 ﾠdollars	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcases	 ﾠmentioned)	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
certification	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIMF	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransaction	 ﾠaccorded	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarrangement.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
proceeds	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠdown	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdebt	 ﾠ–	 ﾠenlarged	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠeverywhere	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
financial/economic	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008-ﾭ‐2009.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠeurozone	 ﾠposes	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠissue,	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠonly	 ﾠstates	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIMF,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠinterventions	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠout	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠBank	 ﾠon	 ﾠbehalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ17	 ﾠ
members.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeurozone	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠone,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠallocated	 ﾠto	 ﾠmember	 ﾠstates	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠstates,	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwere	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscheme.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Rules	 ﾠor	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠwork	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠall	 ﾠparties	 ﾠadhere	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠdisciplines	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ensure	 ﾠcompliance	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtime	 ﾠto	 ﾠtime	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠ
smooth	 ﾠout	 ﾠshocks	 ﾠand	 ﾠtake	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠoff	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
“Compliance”	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmedium-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠframework,	 ﾠsay	 ﾠfive	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
hoped	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠmultilateral	 ﾠsurveillance	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIMF	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠof	 ﾠmutual	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠG20	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠinduce	 ﾠcompliance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠit	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpressures	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficient,	 ﾠ
subsequent	 ﾠallocations	 ﾠof	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdenied	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠoffending	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOr	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠdormant	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠ
XV	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠAgreement	 ﾠon	 ﾠTariffs	 ﾠand	 ﾠTrade,	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠOrganization,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
links	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠto	 ﾠbalance-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐payments	 ﾠconsiderations,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠactivated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠViolation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
adjustment	 ﾠto	 ﾠreserve	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠcould	 ﾠlead	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIMF	 ﾠto	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWTO	 ﾠto	 ﾠactivate	 ﾠArticle	 ﾠXV	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
offending	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpermit	 ﾠimporting	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply	 ﾠrestrictions	 ﾠto	 ﾠproducts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠlevied	 ﾠon	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Some	 ﾠmight	 ﾠworry	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠscale	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstated	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
reserves	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinflationary.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠby	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠwould	 ﾠall	 ﾠreside	 ﾠin	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmember	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠwillingly	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠallocation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpermit	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠrates	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠassure	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠsurpluses,	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠnational	 ﾠ
savings	 ﾠat	 ﾠhome	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠput	 ﾠthem	 ﾠinto	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠreserves,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpermit	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠimports	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOther	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ
equal,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠraise	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠoccasions,	 ﾠas	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
welcome.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠinflationary	 ﾠpressures,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcountered	 ﾠby	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrestrictive	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠby	 ﾠthose	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠthat	 ﾠopenly	 ﾠor	 ﾠimplicitly	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠinflation,	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠthat	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠBritain,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeurozone,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠamong	 ﾠothers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠinflation	 ﾠ
targeting	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠcontinues,	 ﾠSDR	 ﾠallocations	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinflationary	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠglobal	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ One	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmodest	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠ“reserves”	 ﾠjust	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠassets	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmonetary	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMany	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
created	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠ(SWFs)	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠabroad	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠwider	 ﾠportfolio	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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monetary	 ﾠauthorities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSWFs	 ﾠraise	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠIMF	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
appropriate	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠmanaging	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠTruman,	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠ	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠJapan,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠmention	 ﾠ
Switzerland,	 ﾠSweden,	 ﾠand	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠrun	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠsurpluses,	 ﾠmatched	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠoutflows,	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠyield	 ﾠand	 ﾠdiversification	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠin	 ﾠadding	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠinvestment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld’s	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠintegrated.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠcould	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠits	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠby	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠoutflow;	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠits	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠby	 ﾠswitching	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠSWF	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠlonger-ﾭ‐term,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
risky	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠabroad.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSWFs	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠguidelines	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven,	 ﾠas	 ﾠTruman	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsuggested,	 ﾠstiffened	 ﾠguidelines,	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflow	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
That	 ﾠis,	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠswitch	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠback	 ﾠand	 ﾠforth	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreserves	 ﾠand	 ﾠSWFs,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠin	 ﾠextreme	 ﾠ
situations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcovered	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovisions	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmonitoring	 ﾠcompliance.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠsum	 ﾠup:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠmade	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠSDRs	 ﾠat	 ﾠfive	 ﾠyear	 ﾠintervals	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠallotments	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
made	 ﾠannually)	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternationally	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠnational	 ﾠtarget	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠreserves,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠenforce	 ﾠ
adjustment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠtargets,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠaccomplish	 ﾠthree	 ﾠobjectives	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠ
monetary	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠand	 ﾠoperational	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbalance-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐
payments	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠworld	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠglobalized	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠintertemporal	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhave.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠsymmetry	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠ
requiring	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbalance-ﾭ‐of-ﾭ‐payments	 ﾠsurpluses	 ﾠto	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠdeficit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThird,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠincremental	 ﾠliquidity	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠinternationally	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠunit,	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠdependence	 ﾠon	 ﾠnational	 ﾠcurrencies	 ﾠto	 ﾠplay	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrole.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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